WASHINGTON, DC -- America's ability to defend itself and, if necessary, fight a conventional war may be eroding because of military strategies in Iraq, according to a West Point historian who served two combat tours in Iraq.

Last week in its inaugural investigative story, Patriot Majority Today analyzed the decline in U. S. military readiness under the eight-year watch of Pres. Bush, Sen. John McCain and their Congressional allies. 

This week, Patriot Majority Today looks into whether the "Petraeus Doctrine" of counter-insurgency may be further weakening long-term American security interests across the globe.

According to Lt. Colonel Gian Gentile, a West Point history professor who served in Iraq as an executive officer of a combat brigade in Tikrit and as commander of a battalion northwest of Baghdad, the over-emphasis on counterinsurgency as a "solution to every problem" is contributing to America "losing the ability to wage any other kind of war."

Col. Gentile's analysis is a striking contrast to the views of President Bush and Gen. David Petraeus.  And his cautionary critique has sparked controversy among military colleagues.  But after eight years of decline in military readiness, the United States can no longer afford to ignore the informed patriotism of Col. Gentile and others who speak out on America's national security needs in the 21st Century. 

Below are excerpts from "Misreading the Surge," an essay by Col. Gentile that originally appeared in World Politics Review; "Our Troops Did Not Fail in 2006," an op-ed originally published by the International Herald Tribune; and a recent  interview with World Politics Review .

• "[M]isreading the Surge threatens the U.S. Army's conventional capabilities because it reinforces the idea that good units using best counterinsurgency practices can win in any counterinsurgency environment. If we believe that as an Army, then we might be tempted to further our focus on counterinsurgency to the detriment of preparing for other more intense types of war."
• "This hyper-emphasis on counterinsurgency puts the American Army in a perilous condition. Its ability to fight wars consisting of head-on battles using tanks and mechanized infantry is in danger of atrophy."
• "The Israeli experience in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 should warn Americans against having an Army that has become so focused on irregular and counterinsurgency warfare that it can no longer fight large battles against a conventional enemy. In an important essay in the Journal of Strategic Studies, Israeli scholar Avi Kober recently noted that years of policing by the Israeli Army in its territories had degraded its ability to fight the Hezbollah enemy that used conventional tactics. The result was a significant battlefield defeat for the Israeli Army. The American Army is in a similar condition today, and we should be worried."
• "Sen. John McCain said in a recent speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars that the surge's ‘new battle plan is succeeding where our previous tactics failed.' A senior Army officer who was a member of Gen. Patraeus's ‘brain trust' characterized American operations prior to the surge as consisting of hunkering down on large bases, unable to protect the Iraqi people. Neoconservative writer Clifford May noted that, prior to the surge, American combat forces had pretty much quit the country while an Iraq Civil War raged around them. This commentary is simplistic and unfair. It does not accurately represent what was happening prior to the surge at the small unit level, where platoons, companies, and battalions were successfully employing counterinsurgency tactics before the surge had even been conceived."
• "I personally believe that the American Army is not just out of balance but is actually close to breaking, if not already broken. History has shown what happens to armies when they are stretched to the limit."
• "[T]he American Army's professionalism and commitment to duty will cause it to continue to persevere as long as it is ordered to do so in Iraq and Afghanistan. But through its perseverance it will be ground down to a shell of the American Army that existed before to [sic] 2001."
• "In the end, the real question that must be answered before any transformation can occur is: What is the strategic purpose for which a transformed armed force will fight?"
• "The United States has one success in the history of counterinsurgency since WW II to its credit: it succeeded in assisting the legitimate government of El Salvador defeat an internal communist insurgency. However, it was not the U.S. military that defeated the FMLN guerrillas, but the Salvadoran military under the control of its own government, with U.S. encouragement and no more than 50 or so U.S. military advisors. Moreover, El Salvador was not simply a sovereign state: El Salvadoran society was and is a single identity -- an essential prerequisite for successful internal defense of a government struggling for survival and legitimacy. None of these conditions apply to Iraq, where the Iraqi government does not appear to be legitimate in the eyes of its people -- whether Shia, Sunni or Kurd -- and it seems that one Iraqi society does not exist."
• "The reduction in violence has had more to do with the Iraqis than the Americans. First, senior American leaders began paying our former enemies -- non-al-Qaida Sunni insurgents -- large amounts of money to become U.S. allies in fighting al-Qaida. Second, the Shiite militia leader Moqtada al-Sadr announced a six-month ceasefire and stood down his attacks against Iraqi Sunnis and coalition forces; recently, he extended the cease-fire for another six months. Absent those two necessary conditions, there would have been no let up in the level of violence despite the surge."
• "From 1976 to 1982 there were over 110 articles published in the Army's Military Review that fundamentally challenged the emerging doctrine that would become known as ‘Airland Battle.' This in my mind is an example of a wide-ranging debate about an Army's operational doctrine. We have had nothing like that in today's Army for either the new counterinsurgency doctrine, FM 3-24, or the new Operational doctrine, FM 3-0. There are, of course, good reasons why we have not. Unlike the early 1980's, our Army is now at war and has been for the past 6 years, and has not had the luxury of relative peace to think deeply about these matters. But we should at least acknowledge where we are at now with our Army, the actual conditions that we are in, and start thinking hard about where we are headed."
• "There is much to be proud of in American soldiers serving in outfits in Iraq (and Afghanistan). They face dangers every day and continue to serve. Their families go through a lot, too, and are critical to the well being of the army. Nothing of what I have said in terms of my assessment of the security situation in Iraq and understanding the causes for the recent lowering of violence should take away from the credit American military forces fighting in Iraq deserve for their hard work and commitment in the service of the nation."
• "The main difference [in counterinsurgency methods in 2006 and 2007] was a decision by senior American leaders in 2007 to pay large amounts of money to Sunni insurgents to stop attacking Americans and join the fight against Al Qaeda. Coupled with this was the decision by the Shiite militia leader, Moktada al-Sadr, to refrain from attacking coalition forces. The dramatic drop in violence, especially toward Americans, that occurred in Baghdad from June to July 2007 can mainly be explained by these new conditions. If they had not been in place, the increased number of American troops using the so-called new counterinsurgency methods would have continued to take horrendous losses, and the country would still be racked by higher levels of violence."
• "Thankfully, fewer Americans and coalition forces and fewer Iraqis are being killed each month. Perhaps this will last. Time will tell. Iraq is still a hard-to-know, complicated place."

Sources:  International Herald Tribune, "Our Troops Did Not Fail in 2006," January 24, 2008 http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/24/opinion/edgentile.php; World Politics Review, "Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army's Conventional Capabilities," March 4, 2008 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1715; The Wall Street Journal, "Officer Questions Petraeus's Strategy:  Iraq War Veteran Says Focus on Counterinsurgency Hinders Ability to Fight Conventional War," April 7, 2008; and World Politics Review, "The Limits of the Surge: An Interview with Gian Gentile," April 11, 2008 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/Article.aspx?id=1924.